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Abstract 
Using a typical linear model on a sample of listed firms in China over a period of ten years (2006-2016), this 
study empirically attempts proving how peer effects influence corporate research and development (R&D) 
investment decision. The study goes further to demonstrate that peer effects play a significant and critical role 
in determining corporate R&D investment policies, and by extension the more important determinant than 
traditional firm-specific factors. After dealing with endogeneity bias and conducting further robustness checks, 
the above conclusions were valid in this study. It has been theorized in contemporary research that both 
information and market competition are the main channels through which one can best appreciate peer effects 
and that firms with weak information acquisition ability and in highly uncertain or competitive environment 
are more likely to be affected by peer groups. We also find evidence that a firm’s R&D investment status 
relative to its peer firms will affect its R&D investment decision. Moreover, the direction of peer effects 
follows the law of imitation. Thus, firms are more likely to imitate those peers who share similar 
characteristics. Yet, leading firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are exceptionally different as their R&D 
decisions are sensitive to both peer-followers and non-SOEs respectively.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is essential to the survival and evolution of firms in today’s highly competitive environment 
(Forson, 2020; Kim & Koo, 2018). What makes a firm innovative and what drives firms to engage more in 
innovative investment are important topics in finance and management which have attracted tremendous 
attention and research effort from both academic researchers and practitioners alike. 2  It has become 
increasingly important for both policy makers and academic researchers to understand the determinants of firm 
research and development (R&D) investment drive since it is a cornerstone of various R&D-related issues 
(Lee, 2003). Most empirical research on corporate innovation policy thrives on the assumption that R&D 
investment choices are made independently of the actions or characteristics of their peers, or at most implicitly 
assumed to operate through an unmeasured impact on firm-specific determinants (Chen & Ma, 2017; Leary & 
Roberts, 2014). Yet the environment within which a firm exist greatly influence its behavior and it plays an 
integral role in shaping the number of corporate financial policies (Grebel & Nesta, 2017; Joo, Yang & Yang, 
2016; Kaustia & Rantala, 2015; Leary & Roberts, 2014). Research has shown that the actions of peer firms 
may matter for corporate R&D investment policy choices (see Cockburn & Henderson, 1994; Dasgupta & 
Stiglitz, 1980; Grebel & Nesta, 2017). 
  The contribution of this paper is to examine how peer firms behavior matters for corporate R&D investment 
decisions in China. We identify peer groups by three digits industry category and define them as enterprises in 
the same industry in the same year. Our sample includes 1837 companies in China stock markets (i.e. Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) over a decade (2006-2016). Consistent with peer effects prediction, our 
empirical results regardless of the estimation approach show that the average R&D investment intensity of 
peers can positively stimulate enterprises R&D investment. When a firm’s peers increase their R&D 
investment intensity in the previous year, then the firm’s R&D investment intensity is bound to increase in the 
year after. In addition, we also find that these peer effects play a critical role in determining corporate R&D 
investment policies, and more important than most previously identified determinants. To deal with the issue of 
endogeneity bias, we choose peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return shocks as an instrument for peer firms’ 
R&D investment intensity, and retest our empirical sample based on the instrumental variable (IV) approach.  
  One of the challenges in testing peer effects is to identify the peer groups. To avoid peer identification bias, 
we further examined whether the industry peers are really the firm’s reference group in making the corporate 
R&D investment decisions. We focused on the companies that have changed their industry category during the 
                                                             
2 See the survey papers, e.g. He and Tian (2018), Belloc (2012).  
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sample period. There were 333 firms and 356 firm-year observations to meet the test requirement. We 
observed that firm will change its reference groups (or peers) when its industry category has changed. As a 
result, we found it reasonable to choose peers from the industry perspective due to the likelihood of this 
phenomenon. 
  According to Lieberman and Asaba (2006) , information-based theories and rivalry-based theories are the 
main driving mechanisms of peer effects. To examine whether these two mechanisms are the possible channels 
through which peer firms influence a firm’s R&D investment policies, we develop our predictions based on the 
moderating effects of information and competition variables on the relationship between peer firms’ average 
R&D investment intensity and firm j’s R&D investment intensity. We find that the R&D investment policies in 
firms with poor information acquisition ability and in the years with highly economic policy uncertainty to be 
more likely to be affected by peer effects. We also find that peer effects in R&D investment policy is more 
pronounced in a highly competitive market. The above results show that peer effects in enterprise R&D 
investment decision-making is derived from both information and competitive mechanisms. 
In addition, according to Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen (2008) and Yang and Yang (2009), a firm’s 
investment status relative to their peer firms may affect its investment decision. Based on this competitive 
benchmarking mechanism for peer effects, we further examine whether a firm’s R&D investment intensity 
status relative to their peer firms will influence its R&D investment decision. Other evidence gathered showed 
that peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity may be a reference point for firm R&D investment decision. 
When firm’s R&D investment intensity is below the peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity in the last 
year, the firm is more likely to increase its R&D investment in the coming year; and the more it falls behind, 
the greater it improves. These results prove once again that peer effects matter in enterprise R&D investment 
decisions. 
Finally, we examined the heterogeneity of peer effects in corporate R&D investment decision. We find that, 
for R&D investment policy, the follower firms are influenced by both follower-peer and leader-peer firms, but 
the influence from follower-peer firms is larger. Leader firms are only influenced by the follower-peer firms. 
Firms with less profitability are influenced by both less- profitability-peer and more- profitability-peer firms, 
but the influence from less-profitability-peer firms are larger. Firms that are more profitability are only 
influenced by peers that share similar traits (i.e. profitability). Firms with strong innovation ability only pay 
attention to their kind, whiles those that are weak innovators have a two pronged strategies – focus on both 
firms with strong and weak ability, but the influence from weak-ability peer firms are larger. State-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs) attach importance to both SOEs and non-SOEs peer firms, but the influence from non-SOE 
peer firms are larger. Non-SOE attach importance to both SOE and non-SOE peer firms, but the influence from 
non-SOE peer firms are larger. The above results indicated that the influence direction of peer effects in 
general obey the law of imitation from within to without put forward by Tarde (1903).  
  Our study is most closely related to those literatures which emphasized on the importance of enterprises 
cluster (Pouder & Johhn, 1996) and social network (Fracassi 2014; Patnam 2011) as R&D investment policy 
determinant. Broadly speaking, there are two types of mechanisms by which imitating objects can be identified: 
(1) connection, and (2) observation. The former emphasizes on inter-organizational networks, whiles the latter 
holds that imitation can occur through the observation of relevant information obtained from a variety of media 
(McKendrick, 2001; Miner & Haunschild, 1995). Both enterprises cluster and social network in previous 
studies have emphasized on connection mechanism. However, in this study, we stress on the importance of 
observational learning, in which imitation can occur between companies that may have no real connections. 
This is what distinguishes our study from previous ones and thus syncs with our contribution to knowledge to 
stimulate further discourse. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on peer effects and 
develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and data. Section 4 presents our primary results and 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes with some policy recommendations. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Literature Review 
Peer effects exist when an individual’s behavior is affected by his or her interaction with one or more other 
individual (Winston & Zimmerman, 2003). They are empirically elusive in the social sciences, but critical to 
policy makers (Aral & Walker, 2012). These influence can create social multiplier effects, whereby a small 
initial shock can lead to larger changes as individuals are directly influenced by each other’s actions (Kaustia 
& Rantala, 2015). In view of the universality and the important role for solving social problems, peer effects 
have aroused many researchers interest from the fields of sociology, education, economics, psychology, 
finance and management. 
  Corporate actions are a potential domain for such peer effects, as anyone having experience with corporate 
management knows that firms pay close attention to their peer firms (Kaustia & Rantala, 2015). Information 
related to the activities of peer firms is indispensable for almost all corporate strategies (Joo et al., 2016). 
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Recent studies have shown that corporate financial policies and behavior are influenced by their peers, for 
example, corporate capital structures (Leary & Roberts, 2014), stock splits (Kaustia & Rantala, 2015), 
dividend payments (Grennan, 2019), cash holdings (Chen, Chan & Chang, 2019), corporate social 
responsibility (Cao, Liang & Zhan, 2019) and so on. 
  Peer effects are kind of endogenous social effect, wherein the propensity of an individual to behave in some 
way varies with the prevalence of that behavior in some reference group containing the individual (Manski, 
1993). One of the main manifestations of the peer effects is imitation, which is a very common form of 
behavior that arises in a variety of business domains (Leary & Roberts, 2014; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). 
Scholars from diverse disciplines have proposed numerous theories to explain why and how business imitation 
occurs. One of the seminal researches was done by Gabriele Tarde, an outstanding sociologist from France in 
19th century. In his famous book “The Laws of Imitation”, Tarde (1903) thought inter-organizational imitation 
behavior will obey the law of logical imitation and the imitation from within to without. The law of logical 
imitation emphasizes that the appearance of imitated objects and the degree of imitation are intrinsically 
logical. Those with high efficiency, good performance, and high status are more likely to be imitated. The 
imitation from within to without highlight that the individual's imitation and selection of local culture and its 
behavior always takes precedence over foreign culture and its behavior. That is, the imitator has a congenital 
tendency to imitate objects similarly to their own cultural attributes. For example, objects that belong to the 
same cultural space, face similar institutional and industrial policies, share common consumer groups and 
service targets. 
  Another seminal work was done by Lieberman and Asaba (2006), in the paper “Why Do Firms Imitate Each 
Other”, organized numerous theories of business imitation into two broad categories. The first category is 
information-based theories, where information imperfection is the main cause of imitation and firms will 
follow others that are perceived as having superior information. The second category is rivalry-based theories, 
where firms imitate others to limit rivalry or maintain relative position in the market. 
  It is worth noting that there are some other manifestations for peer effects besides imitation. One of the 
examples is that information from peer firms may matter for the firm’s relevant decisions. Foucault and 
Fresard (2014) explained that peers’ stock prices are significantly associated with corporate investment. 
Another example is that a firm’s status relative to their peer firms in some kind of behaviors may also affect its 
decision. Based on the competitive benchmarking theory, Yang and Yang (2009) and Bizjak et al. (2008) find 
that a firm’s CEO (or top executive) pay status relative to its peer firms will affect its pay changes. In general, 
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the peer effects are universals and their influences have many kinds of manifestations. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Through the literature review above, we hold the opinion that peer effects in corporate R&D investment policy 
can also be explained by information-based theory and rivalry-based theory. We do further explication below 
on this matter. 
R&D activity is a kind of explorative behavior, which is highly uncertain with some level of ambiguity 
makes managers to be unsure of the likelihood of possible outcomes. Managers may find it difficult in 
recognizing cause-effect relationships and the full range of potential consequences with great confidence. In 
such environments, managers seek for ways to reduce search uncertainties and costly strategic mistakes 
through mimetic. They are particularly likely to be receptive to information implicit in the actions of peer firms. 
Such information, although highly imperfect, can have a strong influence on managerial perceptions and 
beliefs (see Anand, Mesquita & Vassolo, 2009; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). However, under certain 
circumstances, even if managers have their own private information, they will ignore it and imitate the R&D 
investment decisions of peer firms. Although this behavior is inefficient from a social and economic standpoint, 
it can be rational from the perspective of managers who are concerned about their reputation in the labor 
market (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). 
Rivalry-based theories argue that firms mimic each other to maintain competitive parity or limit rivalry. 
Competitor actions can motivate firms to act, even when social pressures are relatively small (Pacheco & Dean, 
2015). Firm imitate competitor behavior as a response designed to mitigate competitive rivalry or risk. When 
competitors take similar actions, there is less chance that any firm will succeed or fail relative to others. 
Specifically in the area of corporate innovation, the first inventor can obtain first mover advantages and some 
key patent rights of technology. To defuse rivals, the firm will follow the innovation actions of their 
competitors so that R&D investments among competitors may be positively correlated (Anand et al., 2009; 
Fracassi, 2014; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Patnam, 2011). Based these perspectives, we hypothesis that: 
H1: A firm’s R&D investment is significantly affected by its peer firms. 
 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
3.1 Research Design and Model Specification 
(1) Baseline empirical model 
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To examine the influence of peer effects on R&D investment, we adopt a typical linear model by Manski (1993) 
and others (see Joo et al., 2016; Leary & Roberts, 2014) as shown below: 
tjititjitjitjitji XXyy ,,1,,1,,1,,,,   
                     
(1) 
  In equation (1), the indices i, j and t correspond to industry, firm and year, respectively; the indices -j stands 
for peer firms (excluding firm j). t,j,iy is a measure of corporate R&D investment policy, such as firm R&D 
investment intensity (i.e., the ratio of R&D to sales), while the covariate 1t,j,iy   denotes peer firms 
(excluding firm j) average outcomes (i.e., the peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity). This variable is 
lagged for two reasons: First, considering R&D investment policy is a business secret, it is possible but very 
difficult to obtain peer firms’ accurate R&D investment information in real time or even in the same year. 
However, mandatory disclosure of R&D investment information begun in 2007 in China and such information 
is available in the previous year annual report. Second, the contemporaneous measure will trigger serious 
reflection problem raised by Manski (1993) which makes it more difficult to identify mimicking behavior 
(Leary & Roberts, 2014). Fortunately, time lag measure will reduce part of this reflection problem (Mugerman, 
Sade & Shayo, 2014). The vectors 1t,j,iX  and 1t,j,iX  represent peer firms average characteristics and 
firm-specific characteristics respectively. This includes ASSET, INCOME, DAR, ROA, CASH, and TOBINQ 
(see appendix A for the definition of variables). The notations i and t represent industry and year fixed 
effects respectively. t,j,i is the firm-year specific error term assumed to be correlated within firms and 
heteroskedastic. 
  According to Manski (1993), 1t,j,iy  is endogenous effect factor, 1t,j,iX  are exogenous (contextual) effect 
factors, 1t,j,iX  , i and t are correlated effect factors. 3The coefficients 𝜆′ ,𝛿′ ,𝜙′  capture the correlated 
effects; β,   capture the peer effects (Leary & Roberts, 2014). However, only endogenous effects can trigger 
social multiplier effects, and the other two effects could not (Manski, 1993). Thus, this paper focuses on the 
coefficient β. If β statistically significant, then it means a firm’s R&D investment is significantly affected by its 
peer firms. 
 
                                                             
3 Endogenous effect means the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the behavior of the group; 
exogenous (contextual) effect means the propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the exogenous 
characteristics of the group; correlated effect means individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they have 
similar individual characteristics or face similar institutional environment (Manski, 1993). 
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(2) Channel identification model 
To identify the main driving mechanisms of peer effects, we adopt a moderate effect model used by Chen and 
Ma (2017) as shown below: 𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1?̄?𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 ∗ ?̄?𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 + 𝛾′?̄?𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜆′𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑′𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (2) 
  In equation (2), variable 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒 represents the influence channel of peer effects. According to Lieberman 
and Asaba (2006), information-based theories and rivalry-based theories are the two possible channels through 
which peer firms influence firm j’s R&D investment policies. 
  Based on the information theory, firms will actively imitate peer firms’ R&D investment decisions as they 
have imperfect information and they believe that their peers’ actions can convey some useful information. 
Thus, we predict that if firms are able to capture the information that making R&D investment decision needed, 
they will have less incentive to mimic their peer firms’ decisions. We test this prediction in two ways. First, we 
used the market status to measure the informational advantage of a firm. If the firm’s market status is higher, it 
may have the ability to capture more useful information for itself and will be less sensitive to their peer firms’ 
decisions. Following Leary and Roberts (2014), we used a firm’s market share to represent its market status. If 
the firm’s market share rank in the upper third among the peer firms, it means the firm’s market status is higher. 
We also used a dummy variable STATUS which we equated to one, or otherwise to zero. If 𝛽2 is statistically 
negative and significant, then it means that the market status has reverse moderating effects on the relationship 
between firm’s and their peers’ R&D investment, and it can be asserted that the peer effects in corporate R&D 
investment decision-making are partly derived by the information mechanism. 
  Secondly, according to Lieberman and Asaba (2006), environmental uncertainty is the main cause that 
makes firms to imitate each other. Managers are more difficult to predict the consequences of R&D action or 
behavior in an uncertain environment and raises the likelihood of investment failure. The higher the 
environmental uncertainty, the more likelihood that the firms will imitate their peer firms. We used the 
economic policy uncertainty index (EPUI) by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) to capture environmental 
uncertainty. If 𝛽2 is statistically positive and significant, then it means that the economic policy uncertainty 
has up-regulated effects on the relationship between firm’s and their peers’ R&D investment. We can then 
assert that information mechanism is one of the driving mechanisms for corporate R&D investment peer 
effects. 
  Based on the rivalry theory, the reason why firms imitate their peer firms’ innovation decisions is that they 
want to maintain competitive parity or limit rivalry. The fierce competition will encourage companies to 
9 
 
respond more aggressively to competitors’ innovative behavior. Therefore, if we can observe that the firms’ 
R&D investment are more likely to be affected by peers in competitive environment, then we can conclude 
that the peer effects of enterprise R&D investment decision-making is partly derived by the competitive 
mechanism. 
  Following Chen and Ma (2017) and Curry and George (1983), we used market structure and the number of 
peer firms to capture market competition. Thus, market structure is calculated by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). If HHI<0.1, then the market structure belongs to competitive type, the dummy variable HHID equals 
zero; otherwise if HHI>=0.1, the market structure belongs to monopoly type, the dummy variable HHID 
equals one. If 𝛽2 is statistically negative and significant, then it means that the market structure has reverse 
moderating effects on the relationship between firm’s and their peers’ R&D investment. We can base on this 
relationship to assert that peer effects in corporate R&D investment decision-making are partly derived by the 
competitive mechanism. 
  The number of peer firms also can be used to characterize industry competition. The more the peer firms, 
the fiercer the competition between firms (Curry & George, 1983). If the number of peer firms (including firm 
j) in one group is bigger than the median of the whole groups in the sample, then the dummy variable PNUM 
equals one; otherwise if the number of peer firms (including firm j) in one group is smaller than the median of 
the whole groups in the sample, then the dummy variable PNUM equals zero. If 𝛽2 is positive and significant 
statistically, then it means that the competition has up-regulated effects on the relationship between firm’s and 
their peers’ R&D investment, and it can be asserted that the competition mechanism is one of the driving 
mechanisms for corporate R&D investment peer effects. 
  The definitions of other variables in equation (1) and (2) are explained in appendix A. 
 
(3) Another manifestation of peer effects 
In addition to imitation, there is another manifestation for peer effects. According to Yang and Yang (2009) 
and Bizjak et al. (2008), a firm’s pay status relative to their peer firms will affects it pay decision. This is also a 
manifestation of peer effects. To examine whether the corporate R&D investment status relative to the peer 
firms will affect its investment changes after controlling for other factors that are related to R&D investment, 
we adopt a model which also used by Bizjak et al. (2008) and Yang and Yang (2009) as shown below: 𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′?̄?𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜆′𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑′𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡          (3) 
  In equation (3), 𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 represents the change in R&D investment from year t-1 to year t. We use two kinds 
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of measures to capture this change. If the change is positive, then variable ΔRD1 takes the value one; 
otherwise if the change is negative, variable ΔRD1 takes the value zero. Variable ΔRD2 represents the real 
change in R&D investment from year t-1 to year t. 𝑅𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 represents the distance from peer firms’ 
mean R&D investment. We also use two variables to capture this gap. Variable RDGAP1 is a dummy variable, 
if a firm’s R&D investment is below the peer firms’ mean R&D investment in the prior year, then variable RDGAP1 takes the value one; otherwise, RDGAP1 takes the value zero. RDGAP2 equals the peer firm’s 
mean R&D investment in the prior year minus the firm’s R&D investment in the prior year. If RDGAP2 is 
positive, then it indicates that the firm’s R&D investment below the peer firms’ mean R&D investment. If 𝛽1 
is significant in statistically, then it means that the peer effects are important component in determining R&D 
investment. 
  The definitions of other variables in equation (3) are the same as in equation (1), see appendix A. 
(4) The heterogeneity of peer effects 
To examine whether some firms within the peer groups are more or less sensitive to their peers’ R&D 
investment policies, we adopt a model as shown below: 𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′?̄?𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜆′𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿′𝜇𝑖 + 𝜑′𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡     (4) 𝑃𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 represents the mean R&D investment of peer firms, which have the same characteristics with 
firm j; 𝑃𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖,−𝑗,𝑡−1 represents the mean R&D investment of the rest of the peer firms without these 
characteristics. Following Leary and Roberts (2014), we classified peer firms into two groups based on 
firm-specific characteristics such as market share, profitability, innovation ability, and ownership property. 
First, we categorized peer firms into two groups that we call leader and follower based on the income of the 
industry for that year. Leaders are those firms in the upper-third of the distribution, and the remaining part in 
peer groups are called followers. Variable PLEAD represents the mean of R&D investment of peer firms 
which belong to leader enterprises. Variable PFOLLOW represents the mean of R&D investment of peer firms 
which belong to follower enterprises. 
Second, we categorized peer firms into two groups that we called more-profitable enterprises and 
less-profitable enterprises based on the firm-year’s return of asset (ROA). More-profitable enterprises are those 
firms in the upper-third of the distribution, and the remaining part in peer groups are called less-profitable 
enterprises. Variable PPROFIT represents the mean of R&D investment of peer firms which belong to 
more-profitable enterprises. Variable PNPROFIT represents the mean of R&D investment of peer firms which 
belong to less-profitable enterprises. 
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Third, we categorized peer firms into two groups that we called strong enterprises and weak enterprises 
based on the firm’s innovation ability. If a firm listed in “Top 500 Enterprises in Innovation Ability”, which 
produced by ZIJIN MEDIA THINK TANK, then these firms are called strong enterprises; otherwise, the 
remaining part of the peer groups are called weak enterprises. Variable PSTRONG represents the mean of 
R&D investment of peer firms which belong to strong enterprises. Variable PWEAK represents the mean of 
R&D investment of peer firms which belong to weak enterprises. 
Fourth, we classified peer firms into two groups that we called state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) based on the ownership property of actual controller. If a firm’s 
ownership property of actual controller is central or local government, then these firms are called SOEs; 
otherwise, the remaining part in peer groups are called NSOE. Variable PSOE represents the mean of R&D 
investment of peer firms which belong to SOE. Variable PNSOE represents the mean of R&D investment of 
peer firms which belong to NSOE. 
In this part, we focused on the coefficient 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. The definitions of other variables in equation (4) are 
the same as in equation (1), see appendix A. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
China provides an ideal scenario for studying peer effects due to the following reasons. First, the traditional 
culture of China is based on the philosophy of “The Golden Mean”, which emphasizes harmony instead of 
unconventional attitudes. When people make decisions, they may consider the behavior of others in advance. 
Secondly, the Chinese Communist Party pays more attention to “Keep in Alignment” or “orderliness” which 
may affect the behavior of business decision making. 
Following Leary and Roberts (2014), this study defines peer firms as those enterprises in the same industry. 
Specifically, the industry identification method is based on the industry code published by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). In our peer groups, industries are defined based on three-digit CSRC 
industry code. Considering the problem of comparison, the number of companies in the same group are at least 
two. 
  Our primary data on R&D expenditure comes from the Wind database (Wind) for the last nine years 
(2007-2016). The other financial data were derived from China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR) over the last decade (2006-2016). Our sample was confined to industrial enterprises and 
related industrial services enterprises, including manufacturing, information technology services, scientific 
12 
 
research and technology services. We excluded observations with missing data on any variable. The final 
unbalanced panel sample contains 13,604 firm-year observations with 1837 unique firms over the last decade 
(2006-2016)4. To mitigate the influence of extreme observations, we winsorized all continuous variables at the 
1th and 99th percentiles. 
  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables in our final sample. In the sample, the mean 
of R&D investment intensity is 4% almost similar to peer firms’ 3.8%. The mean of ΔRD2 (the first 
differences for R&D investment intensity) is 0.3%, which suggests that firm’s R&D investment intensity have 
been increasing year by year in generally. 
 
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics (N=13604)  
VARIABLES Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
RD 0.040 0.050 0.000 0.291 
MRD 0.038 0.031 0.001 0.152 
ΔRD1 0.491 0.500 0 1 
ΔRD2 0.003 0.023 -0.080 0.111 
RDGAP1 0.614 0.487 0 1 
RDGAP2 0.000 0.0394 -0.186 0.109 
MASSET 0.456 0.220 0.114 1.212 
MINCOME 0.338 0.220 0.069 1.298 
MDAR 0.450 0.137 0.256 1.284 
MROA 0.054 0.030 -0.045 0.168 
MCASH 0.235 0.079 0.091 0.476 
MTOBINQ 0.030 0.014 0.014 0.102 
ASSET 0.308 0.418 0.002 2.613 
INCOME 0.236 0.354 0.006 2.071 
DAR 0.416 0.207 0.044 1.112 
ROA 0.055 0.070 -0.202 0.297 
CASH 0.236 0.167 0.010 0.770 
TOBINQ 0.029 0.023 0.002 0.148 
STATUS 0.358 0.480 0 1 
EPUI 1.455 0.502 0.733 2.444 
HHID 0.381 0.486 0 1 
PNUM 0.491 0.500 0 1 
Note. All numeric values are reserved to three decimal places. The unit of ASSET and INCOME is 100 million yuan. Both TOBINQ and EPUI are 
divided by 100. 
 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
                                                             
4 Considering the data availability, our sample period starts from the year in 2006. Because the Ministry of Finance of China 
implemented a policy that listed companies need to disclose the amount of research and development expenditures since January 
1th, 2007. Before this, we can’t obtain the data of R&D investment. 
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4.1 Main empirical results for baseline model 
Table 2 presents the empirical results for the peer effects in R&D investment policy. Before regression, we 
used Hausman Test to decide which kinds of estimation method (fixed or random effect) is suitable for our 
panel data. As the Hausman Test result Chi-square value equals to 841.68, P-value is 0.000, so that fixed effect 
is more appropriate for the estimation of our panel data.  
In Column (1) of Table 2, the main variable MRD (peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity) shows a 
positive and significant relationship with variable RD (firm j’s R&D investment intensity). The coefficient of 
MRD is 0.308, significant at 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in peer firms’ R&D investment 
intensity leads to 30.8 percentage point increase in firm j’s R&D investment intensity. In addition, variable 
MCASH, INCOME, CASH, TOBINQ exhibit significant relationship with RD. These results indicate that 
after controlling the contextual and correlated factors, it still can find that the firm j’s R&D investment 
decision will be significantly affected by its peer firms’ R&D investment policies. When peer firms increase 
their R&D investment intensity in the previous year, the firm j’s R&D investment intensity will be increased in 
the coming year.  
Moreover compared to traditional firm-specific determinants, peer firms’ R&D investment policy have a 
significantly larger effect. For example, in column (1) of Table 2, the next-most impactful variable is TOBINQ, 
whose scaled coefficient is 0.093 (which is almost 2.4 times smaller). These results lend credence to our 
hypothesis which suggest that peer effects are one of the most important forces that stimulates corporate 
innovation investment. 
 
TABLE 2 Peer effects on a firm’s R&D investment policy 
 Panel A：Fixed effects model Panel B：Instrumental variable model 
VARIABLES 
RD 
(1) 
MRD 
(1) first-stage 
RD 
(2) second-stage 
MRD 0.308***(0.054)  0.257**(0.101) 
PIERS  0.009***(0.000)  
MASSET -0.001(0.002) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002(0.002) 
MINCOME 0.002(0.003) -0.014***(0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 
MDAR 0.004(0.004) -0.014***(0.001) 0.004(0.003) 
MROA 0.006(0.014) -0.001(0.005) 0.007(0.014) 
MCASH -0.023**(0.011) 0.086***(0.004) -0.020(0.013) 
MTOBINQ 0.051(0.044) 0.231***(0.012) 0.068(0.047) 
ASSET 0.001(0.001) 0.001*(0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 
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INCOME -0.024***(0.004) 0.001(0.001) -0.024***(0.002) 
DAR -0.005(0.004) 0.001(0.001) -0.005*(0.002) 
ROA -0.011(0.007) -0.003* (0.002) -0.011**(0.005) 
CASH 0.009**(0.004) -0.002** (0.001) 0.009***(0.002) 
TOBINQ 0.093***(0.028) 0.043***(0.005) 0.096***(0.016) 
_Cons 0.025***(0.005) -0.019***(0.002) 0.024***(0.005) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 13,604 13,604 13,604 
No. of groups 1,837 1,837 1,837 
Adj. R2 0.149 0.777 0.152 
F/ Wald chi2 38.88*** 753.71*** 35603.13*** 
Note. The sample consists of 1837 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from the year 2006 to 2016 with 
non-missing data for all analysis variables (see Appendix A). Peer groups are defined by three-digit CSRC industry code. The 
dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. Panel A column (1) presents the results based on the baseline model. Panel 
B column (2) and (3) presents the results based on the instrumental variable model (Column (2) and (3) presents the results of 
first-stage and second-stage, respectively). Industry and year fixed effects are all controlled in these models. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. All coefficient are adjusted using company clustering. 
*indicates statistical significance at 10% level. 
** indicates statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
4.2 Endogeneity bias and treatment 
To identify peer effects, one of the challenges is the reflection problem raised by Manski (1993). Peer firms’ 
behavior can influence firm j’s decision, meanwhile, firm j’s behavior can also affect its peer firms’ decision. 
This simultaneous movements like a man and his reflection in a mirror. It’s hard to tell whether this mirror 
image cause the person’s movements or just reflect them. This simultaneity implies that 1t,j,iy   is an 
endogenous variable. Although following Mugerman et al. (2014) approach which allowed us to use a one 
lagged period model, we observed further that the problem of endogeneity bias was not fully resolved. 
  To find a lasting solution to the endogeneity bias problem, there was the need for an enhanced robustness 
check of our results. Thus, following Leary and Roberts (2014), we adopted the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach and choose peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return shocks (PIERS) as an instrument for peer firms’ 
R&D investment intensity (MRD). Substantial theoretical and empirical evidence shows that corporate 
innovation relevant for stock returns (see Sood & Tellis, 2009; Vassalou & Apedjinou, 2003). Peer firms’ 
idiosyncratic equity return shocks are serially uncorrelated and cross-uncorrelated (see Chen & Ma, 2017; 
Leary & Roberts, 2014). Peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return shocks are relevant for peer firms’ R&D 
investment intensity, but not relevant for firm j’s R&D investment intensity. These characteristics make the 
15 
 
peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return shocks (PIERS) meet the requirement of IV for our research. More 
precisely, the data on idiosyncratic equity return shocks comes from Wind database for the period of nine years 
(2006-2015). 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 displays the results based on the IV regression estimation. The first-stage 
regression results are shown in column (2), and we can see that the peer firms’ average idiosyncratic equity 
return shocks (PIERS) is strongly and positively correlated with peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
(MRD) with a coefficient of 0.009 and significant at 1％ level. The second-stage regression results are shown 
in column (3), and the main variable MRD (peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity) shows a positive 
relationship with RD (firm j’s R&D investment intensity) with a coefficient of 0.257 significant at 1％ level. 
These results are consistent with the priori expectations in our baseline model. In addition, the Multivariate 
F-statistic is 1138.04 in the first-stage, which is much bigger than experience value 10, so that the variable 
PIERS is not a weak IV. Based on the above analysis, we can argue to some extent that a firm’s R&D 
investment policies are partly driven by a response to their peer firms. 
 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
The above results show that peer effects are important determinants of corporate R&D investment decisions 
and such behavior is in reference to the industry the firm finds itself. In order to avoid peer identification bias 
from the current criteria, we do further test to ascertain whether industry peers really matter for firm’s R&D 
investment decisions. The rule of thumb is that, if it does matter then when a firm’s industry is changed, it 
should automatically affect its reference group accordingly. Based on this, we focus on companies that have 
changed their industry category during the sample period. There were 333 firms who changed their industry 
code between 2007 and 2016. Among these firms, 311 firms changed their industry one time, and 21 firms 
changed twice, with the remaining firms having changed thrice. 
  Table 3 present the test results based on the importance of industry peers from the perspective of the IV 
regression estimation approach. In panel A, the identification of the peer groups is based on the industry code 
before code change, whiles in panel B, the identification of the peer groups is based on the industry code after 
changes were made to its code. For instance, if a firm’s industry code was C13 in 2007, but in 2008 it changed 
to C27. This implies that the firm had two kinds of peer groups: (1) firms with industry code C13 (in panel A) 
and (2) firms with industry code C27 (in panel B). We argue that if the industry peers really matter to the firms’ 
R&D investment decision, then the firm will change its reference groups with the ensuing change of industry 
16 
 
code and is supposed to be significant in both panels A and B respectively.  
  In column (1) of panel A, we can see that the peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return shocks (PIERS) is 
strongly and positively correlated with peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity (MRD) in the first-stage, 
the coefficient is 0.03 and significance at 1％ level. But the relationship between MRD (peer firms’ average 
R&D investment intensity) and RD (firm j’s R&D investment intensity) is not significant in the second-stage, 
as shown in column (2) of panel A. In column (1) of panel B, peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return shocks 
(PIERS) is strongly and positively correlated with peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity (MRD) in the 
first-stage, the coefficient is 0.031 and significance at 1％ level. At the same time, our main variable MRD 
(peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity) shows a positive relationship with RD (firm’s R&D 
investment intensity) in the second-stage, the coefficient is 0.805 and significance at 1％ level, as shown in 
column (2) of panel B. In addition, the Multivariate F-statistic in first-stage of panel A and panel B are 106.854 
and 102.037, respectively, which are bigger than experience value 10. This means that our instruments variable 
is not weak. Thus, peer effects are significant in panel B, but not significant in panel A, which means that a 
firm will change its reference groups when its industry code changed. We can also conclusion that industry 
peers are really matter for firm’s R&D investment decision as assumed and its reasonable for us to choose the 
peers from the perspective of industry. 
 
TABLE 3 The test for the importance of industry peers 
Variable 
Panel A: The identification of peer groups is 
based on the industry code before its change 
Panel B: The identification of peer groups is 
based on the industry code after its change 
MRD 
 (1) first-stage 
RD 
 (2) second-stage 
MRD 
 (1) first-stage 
RD  
(2) second-stage 
MRD  0.493(0.312)  0.805***(0.298) 
PIERS 0.030***(0.003)  0.031***(0.003)  
MASSET 0.018***(0.006) 0.044**(0.019) 0.000(0.007) 0.035(0.022) 
MINCOME -0.032***(0.007) -0.022(0.024) -0.004(0.007) -0.022(0.022) 
MDAR -0.020***(0.006) 0.017(0.022) -0.084***(0.010) 0.026(0.041) 
MROA -0.027(0.036) -0.081(0.115) -0.406***(0.055) 0.195(0.212) 
MCASH 0.243***(0.013) 0.047(0.063) 0.363***(0.017) -0.082(0.102) 
MTOBINQ 0.029(0.071) 0.172(0.228) 0.492***(0.081) -0.650*(0.361) 
ASSET 0.017***(0.005) 0.033**(0.016) 0.009*(0.005) 0.044***(0.016) 
INCOME -0.017***(0.006) -0.046**(0.021) -0.004(0.006) -0.058***(0.020) 
DAR -0.019***(0.005) -0.048***(0.018) -0.008(0.006) -0.052***(0.017) 
ROA -0.026*(0.014) -0.009(0.046) -0.033**(0.015) -0.024(0.046) 
CASH -0.003(0.007) 0.010(0.021) 0.010(0.007) 0.007(0.020) 
TOBINQ 0.073**(0.036) 0.147(0.121) 0.108***(0.041) 0.100(0.136) 
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_Cons -0.012*(0.007) 0.006(0.021) -0.015*(0.008) 0.038(0.023) 
No. of obs. 356 356 356 356 
Adj. R2 0.715 0.253 0.827 0.236 
F/ Wald chi2 69.50*** 118.32*** 131.17*** 109.08*** 
Note. The subsample consists of 333 firms whose industry code were changed at least once between 2007 to 2016. Peer groups 
are defined by three-digit CSRC industry code. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. This table presents the 
results based on the instrumental variable model and choose peer firms’ idiosyncratic equity return shocks (PIERS) as the 
instrument for peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity (MRD). In panel A, the identification of peer groups is based on the 
industry code before its change, and in panel B, the identification of peer groups is based on the industry code after its change. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All coefficient are adjusted using company clustering. 
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level. 
** indicates statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
4.4 Channel identification 
To further investigate the driving mechanisms of peer effects, we develop our predictions based on the 
information theory and rivalry theory, and empirically examine the moderating effects of relevant variables on 
the relationship between peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity (MRD) and the firm’s R&D investment 
intensity (RD). Panel A and panel B in Table 4 report the respective results based on the channel identification 
model. 
  In column (1) of panel A, the coefficient of interaction term STATUS*MRD is -0.084 and significant at 10% 
level. It means that the lower a firm’s market status, the more sensitive it is to its peer firms’ R&D investment 
decisions (the marginal effect can also be observed in figure 1(1)). In column (2) of panel A, the coefficient of 
interaction term EPUI*MRD is 0.050 and significant at 5% level. This implies that the higher the 
environmental uncertainty, the more likely the firm will imitate peer firms’ R&D investment decisions (the 
marginal effect can also be observed in figure 1(2)). Both firm’s market status and economic policy 
uncertainty index are relevant to firm’s information acquisition ability. These results indicate further that peer 
effects in corporate R&D investment decision-making are partly driven by the information mechanism. 
In column (1) of panel B, the coefficient of interaction term HHID*MRD is -0.045 and significant at 10% 
level. In column (2) of panel B, the coefficient of interaction term PNUM*MRD is 0.196 and significant at 1% 
level. Both results imply that firms’ R&D investment decision in a fiercer competitive environment are more 
likely to be affected by peer groups (the marginal effect can also be saw in figure 1(3) and (4)). Therefore, 
there is the tendency that peer effects in corporate R&D investment decision-making are partly driven by 
competitive mechanism. 
In summary, both information and competitive mechanisms are the channels of peer effects in corporate 
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R&D investment decisions. These conclusions are consistent with Lieberman and Asaba (2006) and Chen and 
Ma (2017), who claimed that information and rivalry are the main causes why a firm’s behavior is affected by 
its peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 Channel identification of peer effect 
VARIABLES 
Panel A: Information mechanism Panel B: Competitive mechanism 
(1) Market Status (2) Market Uncertainty (3) Market Structure (4) Number of Peers 
RD RD RD RD 
MRD 0.362***(0.056) 0.230***(0.057) 0.331***(0.055) 0.149***(0.054) 
STATUS* MRD -0.084*(0.050)    
STATUS -0.000(0.002)    
EPUI* MRD  0.050**(0.022)   
EPUI  0.015***(0.003)   
HHID* MRD   -0.045*(0.025)  
HHID   0.003** (0.001)  
PNUM* MRD    0.196***(0.063) 
PNUM    -0.006**(0.002) 
MASSET -0.001(0.002) -0.001(0.002) -0.001(0.002) -0.001(0.002) 
MINCOME 0.001(0.003) 0.003(0.003) 0.001(0.003) 0.003(0.003) 
MDAR 0.004(0.004) 0.004(0.004) 0.005(0.004) 0.004(0.004) 
MROA 0.006(0.014) 0.007(0.014) 0.010(0.013) 0.018(0.013) 
MCASH -0.022**(0.011) -0.026**(0.011) -0.022*(0.011) -0.013(0.011) 
MTOBINQ 0.054(0.043) 0.047(0.044) 0.037(0.043) 0.026(0.043) 
ASSET 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 
INCOME -0.021***(0.004) -0.024***(0.004) -0.024***(0.004) -0.024***(0.004) 
DAR -0.004(0.004) -0.005(0.004) -0.005(0.004) -0.005(0.004) 
ROA -0.009(0.007) -0.011(0.007) -0.011(0.007) -0.010(0.007) 
CASH 0.009**(0.004) 0.009**(0.004) 0.009**(0.004) 0.009**(0.004) 
TOBINQ 0.087***(0.028) 0.094***(0.028) 0.092***(0.028) 0.091***(0.028) 
_Cons 0.024***(0.005) 0.014**(0.006) 0.022***(0.005) 0.022***(0.005) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 13,604 13,604 13,604 13,604 
No. of groups 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
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Adj. R2 0.150 0.149 0.149 0.150 
F 38.03*** 38.33*** 37.64*** 38.74*** 
Note. The sample consists of 1837 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from the year 2006 to 2016 with 
non-missing data for all analysis variables (see Appendix A). Peer groups are defined by three-digit CSRC industry code. The 
dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. This table presents the results based on the channel identification model. 
Industry and year fixed effects are all controlled in these models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All coefficient are 
adjusted using company clustering. 
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level. 
** indicates statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
  
(1)                                              (2) 
  
(3)                                              (4) 
Figure 1 The marginal effect of MRD on RD based on different moderators 
 
4.5 Another manifestation for peer effects 
To further investigate another manifestation for peer effects, we develop our predictions based on the 
competitive benchmarking theory and empirically examine whether a firm’s R&D investment status relative to 
peer firms affects its R&D investment decision. The empirical results are shown in Table 5. 
  The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 are based on conditional fixed-effects logistic regression model. 
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The results in columns (3) through (6) of Table 5 are based on the fixed-effects (within) regression model. In 
column (1), the coefficient of RDGAP1 is 1.121 and significant at 1% level. In column (2), the coefficient of 
RDGAP2 is 29.792 and significant at 1% level. In column (3), the coefficient of RDGAP1 is 0.256 and 
significant at 1% level. In column (4), the coefficient of RDGAP2 is 5.103 and significant at 1% level. In 
column (5), the coefficient of RDGAP1 is 0.019 and significant at 1% level. In column (6), the coefficient of 
RDGAP2 is 0.468 and significant at 1% level. These results imply that if a firm’s R&D investment intensity is 
below the peers’ average R&D investment intensity in the year past, then the firm is more likely to increase its 
R&D investment in the year ahead. The more the firm falls behind, the greater it improves in the coming year. 
Firm which temporarily fell behind will continuously improve its R&D investment intensity to the level that 
would make it more competitive. Because of this competitive benchmarking between the peer firms, the R&D 
investment level is getting higher and higher. 
 
TABLE 5 Another tests for peer effect 
VARIABLES 
Panel A: Conditional fixed-effects 
logistic regression model 
Panel B: Fixed-effects (within) regression model 
ΔRD1 
(1) 
ΔRD1 
(2) 
ΔRD1 
(3) 
ΔRD1 
(4) 
ΔRD2 
(5) 
ΔRD2 
(6) 
RDGAP1 1.121***(0.058)  0.256***(0.012)  0.019***(0.001)  
RDGAP2  29.792***(1.198)  5.103***(0.264)  0.468***(0.019) 
MASSET -0.212(0.165) -0.175(0.167) -0.049(0.037) -0.039(0.037) -0.001(0.001) -0.000(0.001) 
MINCOME 0.224(0.233) 0.188(0.239) 0.037(0.053) 0.038(0.053) 0.003(0.002) 0.004(0.002) 
MDAR 0.413(0.261) 0.426(0.264) 0.084(0.057) 0.070(0.057) 0.007***(0.003) 0.007***(0.002) 
MROA -1.434(1.121) -1.859(1.154) -0.272(0.264) -0.415(0.261) 0.009(0.012) -0.005(0.011) 
MCASH 0.807(0.961) -0.517(0.981) 0.154(0.212) -0.135(0.214) 0.001(0.009) -0.027***(0.009) 
MTOBINQ -6.017**(2.710) -8.323***(2.832) -1.148*(0.659) -1.307**(0.665) -0.110***(0.036) -0.126***(0.035) 
ASSET -0.018(0.075) 0.017(0.076) -0.005(0.017) 0.001(0.016) -0.001(0.001) 0.000(0.001) 
INCOME -1.650***(0.206) -1.686***(0.210) -0.347***(0.049) -0.343***(0.049) -0.018***(0.002) -0.018***(0.002) 
DAR -0.422**(0.211) -0.428**(0.218) -0.112**(0.047) -0.105**(0.047) -0.010***(0.003) -0.009***(0.002) 
ROA -0.828**(0.407) -0.591(0.424) -0.222**(0.087) -0.160*(0.087) -0.026***(0.005) -0.018***(0.005) 
CASH 0.949***(0.204) 0.949***(0.210) 0.205***(0.047) 0.187***(0.047) 0.014***(0.003) 0.013***(0.003) 
TOBINQ -2.100(1.321) -0.215(1.390) -0.595**(0.292) -0.191(0.303) 0.002(0.020) 0.035*(0.020) 
_Cons N/A N/A 0.140*(0.081) 0.446***(0.081) -0.005(0.004) 0.020***(0.003) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 12,9875 12,987 13,604 13,604 13,604 13,604 
No. of groups 1,670 1,670 1,837 1,837 1,837 1,837 
                                                             
5 167 groups (617 observations) are dropped because of all positive or all negative outcomes, so that in conditional fixed-effects 
logistic regression model, the number of observations (12987) and the number of groups (1670) are a little smaller than the 
fixed-effects (within) regression model. 
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Adj. R2 N/A N/A 0.094 0.122 0.111 0.258 
LRchi2/F 1167.13*** 1648.21*** 22.48*** 30.22*** 26.97*** 75.60*** 
Note. The sample consists of 1837 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from the year 2006 to 2016 with 
non-missing data for all analysis variables (see Appendix A). Peer groups are defined by three-digit CSRC industry code. The 
dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. Industry and year fixed effects are all controlled in these models. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. All coefficient are adjusted using company clustering. 
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level. 
** indicates statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
4.6 The heterogeneity of peer effects 
Table 6 reports the results about the heterogeneity of peer effects in corporate R&D investment decision. Panel 
A presents the difference between follower and leader. In column (1), the coefficient of PFOLLOW is 0.219 
and significant at 1% level, the coefficient of PLEAD is 0.026 and significant at 10% level. In column (2), the 
coefficient of PFOLLOW is 0.326 and significant at 1% level, but the coefficient of PLEAD is not significant. 
These results show that peer-follower R&D investment intensity are influenced by both their follower and 
leader-peer firms, but the follower-peer rivals have a greater impact (0.219>0.026). However the R&D 
investment decisions of leaders are only affected by follower-peer firms. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Ross and Sharapov (2015) who explained that a leader imitate the action of a follower in order to 
avoid dethronement. This they further indicated is an effective competitive strategy. 
  Panel B presents the difference between more-profitable firms and less-profitable firms. In column (3), the 
coefficients of PLESS and PMORE are significant at 1% (β = 0.115 and 0.035 respectively). That 
notwithstanding, in column (4), the coefficient of PMORE is still significant at 1% (β = 0.045), whiles that of 
PLESS is insignificant. These results indicate that less-profitable firms’ R&D investment decision are 
influenced by both less-profitable peers and more-profitable peers, yet less-profitable peer rivals have a greater 
impact (0.115>0.035). However more-profitable firms’ R&D investment decision are only affected by 
more-profitable peers. 
  Panel C presents the difference between firms with strong innovation ability and firms with weak innovation 
ability. In column (5), the coefficient of PWEAK is 0.163 and significant at 1% level. PSTRONG is also 
significant at 5% (β =0.030). In column (6), the coefficient of PSTRONG is 0.136 and significant at 5% level, 
whiles that of PWEAK is insignificant. These results imply that the R&D investment decision in firms which 
with weak innovation ability are influenced by both weak-ability peers and strong-ability peers, but the 
weak-ability peer rivals have a greater impact (0.163>0.030). However, R&D investment decision in firms 
with strong innovation ability are only affected by peers with strong-ability. 
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  Panel D presents the difference between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-state-owned enterprises 
(non-SOE). In column (7), the coefficient of PNSOE is 0.125 and significant at 5% level. PSOE is significant 
at 10% (β = 0.021). In column (8), we find disparities in the coefficients of PNSOE and PSOE (β= 0.248, 
0.061 respectively 𝑝 < 0.05). These results indicate that R&D investment decision in non-SOE are influenced 
by both non-SOE peers and SOE peers, but non-SOE peer rivals have a greater impact (0.125>0.021). The 
R&D investment decision in SOEs are influenced by both SOEs peers and non-SOE peers, but non-SOE peer 
rivals have a greater impact (0.248>0.061). In generally, non-SOE are more innovative than SOE in China. 
This result means that SOEs are getting better in innovation year by year through lifelong learning from 
non-SOE peer rivals. 
  The above results indicate that peer effects in corporate R&D investment decision are heterogeneous in 
nature and scope, yet they tend to obey the law of imitation from within to without as advanced by Tarde 
(1903). The R&D investment decision of a firm is more likely to be affected by peers it share similar 
characteristics. 
 
5 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
In this paper, we examine the influence of peer effects in corporate R&D investment policy decision based on 
a decade data (2006-2016) of listed firms in China. Our result shows that firms do not make R&D investment 
decisions in isolation and that there is an imminent influence from the peers it belongs. Indeed, compared to 
traditional firm-specific determinants, the R&D investment policy of peer firms are remarkably robust with 
larger impact on corporate R&D investment decision. In general, these impacts are in line with the law of 
imitation (i.e. from within to without). Thus, for firms to make R&D investment decision, there is the 
likelihood of those firms imitating peers who share similar characteristics. Yet in all these scenarios, there may 
be some exceptional cases where leader-peers R&D investment decision may be more sensitive to their 
follower-peers. Similarly, SOEs R&D investment decision may be more sensitive to their non-SOE-peers. 
  The most interesting implication of our study has to do with the emergence of the presence of R&D 
investment externalities. Thus, peer effects has the propensity to encourage similar ones to follow suit and thus 
exacerbate investment in R&D decisions. Therefore to increase corporate enthusiasm for R&D investment 
activities and stimulate enterprise creativity, the government should take advantage of this externality. As 
information and competitive mechanism are potential channels for these peer effects, one of the possible 
measures is to standardize and strengthen the disclosure of R&D investment information, and the other is to 
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increase the degree of competition in the industry. 
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TABLE 6 The heterogeneity of peer effects 
VARIABLES 
Panel A: follower vs. leader 
Panel B: more-profitable firms vs. less-profitable 
firms 
Panel C: firms with strong innovation ability vs. 
firms with weak innovation ability 
Panel D: SOE vs. non-SOE 
Follower  Leader Less-profitable firms More-profitable firms Weak  Strong non-SOE firms SOE firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RD RD RD RD RD RD RD RD 
PFOLLOW 0.219***(0.055) 0.326***(0.098)       
PLEAD 0.026*(0.014) 0.007(0.012)       
PLESS   0.115***(0.035) 0.007(0.066)     
PMORE   0.035***(0.013) 0.045**(0.021)     
PWEAK     0.163***(0.039) 0.002(0.060)   
PSTRONG     0.030**(0.015) 0.136**(0.068)   
PNSOE       0.125**(0.050) 0.248***(0.068) 
PSOE       0.021*(0.012) 0.061**(0.025) 
MASSET -0.000(0.003) -0.004*(0.002) -0.006*(0.003) -0.001(0.003) 0.002(0.002) -0.017**(0.007) -0.003(0.003) -0.001(0.003) 
MINCOME 0.004(0.005) 0.006*(0.004) -0.001(0.004) -0.003(0.006) 0.003(0.003) 0.003(0.009) -0.003(0.005) 0.003(0.004) 
MDAR 0.008(0.006) -0.007**(0.003) 0.005(0.005) -0.006(0.004) 0.001(0.004) 0.001(0.014) 0.006(0.005) -0.006(0.004) 
MROA -0.009(0.021) -0.007(0.020) 0.029*(0.016) -0.044*(0.023) 0.017(0.014) -0.044(0.040) 0.008(0.020) 0.011(0.017) 
MCASH -0.052***(0.018) -0.017(0.014) -0.033**(0.015) -0.003(0.020) -0.009(0.013) -0.040(0.032) -0.004(0.016) -0.030*(0.016) 
MTOBINQ 0.088(0.070) 0.079(0.054) 0.037(0.061) 0.131(0.081) 0.129**(0.052) -0.122(0.117) 0.094(0.062) 0.100(0.081) 
ASSET -0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.001) -0.000(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001) -0.000(0.002) 0.000(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 
INCOME -0.103***(0.017) -0.017***(0.004) -0.024***(0.005) -0.013**(0.005) -0.028***(0.004) -0.024***(0.008) -0.031***(0.006) -0.022***(0.005) 
DAR -0.007(0.005) -0.000(0.004) -0.011*(0.006) -0.001(0.007) -0.004(0.004) -0.004(0.012) -0.009(0.005) 0.004(0.007) 
ROA -0.013(0.009) 0.016**(0.008) 0.001(0.011) -0.009(0.016) -0.007(0.007) -0.026(0.021) -0.020**(0.010) -0.008(0.011) 
CASH 0.009**(0.004) -0.002(0.006) 0.006(0.006) 0.010*(0.006) 0.005(0.004) 0.025**(0.012) 0.005(0.004) 0.002(0.007) 
TOBINQ 0.092***(0.032) 0.029(0.051) 0.140***(0.049) 0.063*(0.038) 0.096***(0.030) 0.138*(0.081) 0.104***(0.034) 0.077(0.051) 
_Cons 0.033***(0.007) 0.016**(0.006) 0.027***(0.006) 0.004(0.011) 0.017***(0.005) 0.028*(0.014) 0.028***(0.008) 0.017**(0.007) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 8,719 4,867 8,822 4,764 10,927 2,599 8,478 5,013 
No. of groups 1,531 852 1,588 1,450 1,496 338 1,325 609 
Adj. R2 0.139 0.213 0.138 0.121 0.147 0.164 0.115 0.207 
F 22.23*** 20.95*** 22.35*** 9.10*** 30.43*** 10.91*** 17.77*** 10.81*** 
Note. The sample consists of 1837 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from the year 2006 to 2016 with non-missing data for all analysis variables (see Appendix A). Peer 
groups are defined by three-digit CSRC industry code. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of columns. This table presents the results based on the Fixed-effects (within) regression 
model. The total number of samples in panel A, panel B, panel C and panel D, are 13586, 13586, 13526,13491, respectively, slightly less than 13604. This is mainly because we require at least 
two companies in the same peer group. If the group only have one company, then it will be automatically deleted. Industry and year fixed effects are all controlled in these models. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. All coefficient are adjusted using company clustering. 
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level. 
** indicates statistical significance at 5% level. 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Appendix A Definition of variables  
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
RD The ratio of R&D expenses to last year’s sales (R&D investment intensity) 
MRD Peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
ASSET Natural logarithm of total asset 
INCOME Natural logarithm of income 
DAR The ratio of total debt to total assets  
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets  
CASH The ratio of cash asset to total assets  
TOBINQ Tobin's Q ratio, equals total market value / (total assets - net intangible assets- net goodwill) 
MASSET Peer firms’ average ASSET  
MINCOME Peer firms’ average INCOME 
MDAR  Peer firms’ average DAR 
MROA Peer firms’ average ROA 
MCASH Peer firms’ average CASH 
MTOBINQ Peer firms’ average TOBINQ 
ALPHA Idiosyncratic equity returns, calculated by CAPM 
MALPHA Peer firms average ALPHA 
STATUS Dummy variable, if a firm’s market share rank in the upper third among the peer firms, then 
STATUS equals one, otherwise equals zero 
EPUI The economic policy uncertainty index constructed by (Baker et al., 2016) 
HHID Dummy variable, If HHI<0.1, HHID equals zero; otherwise equals one. 
PNUM Dummy variable, if the number of peer firms in one group is bigger than the median of the 
whole groups in the sample, then PNUM equals one; otherwise equals zero. 
ΔRD1 Dummy variable, if the change in R&D investment from year t-1 to year t is positive, then 
ΔRD1 equals one, otherwise equals zero 
ΔRD2 The first differences for R&D investment intensity 
RDGAP1 Dummy variable, if a firm’s R&D investment intensity is below the mean of peer firms’ R&D 
investment intensity in the prior year, then equals one, otherwise equals zero 
RDGAP2 Equals the peer firms’ mean R&D investment intensity minus the firm’s R&D investment 
intensity in the prior year 
PLEAD leader-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
PFOLLOW Follower-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
PPROFIT More-profitable-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
PNPORFIT Less-profitable-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
PSTRONG With strong innovation ability-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
PWEAK With weak innovation ability-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
PSOE State-owned-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
PNSOE Non-state-owned-peer firms’ average R&D investment intensity 
Industry FE Industry controlled 
Year FE Year controlled 
 
